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Abstract
Based on labour supply parameter estimates and childcare demand parameters for
the Australian population in 2002, this paper illustrates how an extended childcare
subsidy proposed by the Taskforce on Care Costs in October 2006 can be evaluated
using a microsimulation model. First, the cost to the government is predicted assuming
unchanged labour supply behaviour. Then the labour supply effects of the TOCC
proposal are predicted for single parents and couple families separately, including a
revised prediction of the cost to the government which takes the labour supply responses
into account.
1. Introduction
This paper examines how, relative to the existing policy in Australia in July 2006, a
proposed childcare subsidy which increases the reimbursement of out-of-pocket
childcare costs is expected to affect the labour force participation of sole parents and
couple families, and the government’s net expenditure. More specifically, this paper
analyses a policy proposal by the Taskforce on Care Costs (TOCC) to reimburse families
for the cost of caring. The primary recommendation is that the Government reimburse
50 per cent of an employee’s out of pocket care costs up to a maximum of $20,000,
resulting in a maximum reimbursement of $10,000 per annum per household.1 In
addition, the alternative of a 100 per cent reimbursement is investigated.
Building on the labour supply models estimated in Kalb and Lee (2007), this
paper uses the Melbourne Institute Tax and Transfer Simulator (MITTS), a
microsimulation model, to simulate the labour supply effects of the TOCC proposal.
The paper analyses how the effect is distributed across single parent and couple families
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  A report entitled Where to Now? was released by the TOCC in October 2006 and officially handed
to the Federal Government. Although the TOCC report also discusses elderly care and disability
care costs, only the effects related to childcare costs were analysed by the authors of this paper.
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with childcare responsibilities, and computes the corresponding implication for
government expenditure with and without allowing for labour supply responses.
Section 2 of the paper describes the proposed alternative of the TOCC for
reimbursing childcare costs in more detail. Section 3 presents the methodological
approach used and the assumptions made. The simulation results of the proposed policy
change are reported in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes with a few brief remarks.
2. The Current Situation and the Proposed Alternative
The TOCC (2006b) designed an alternative childcare subsidy which aims to enhance
the existing Childcare Tax Rebate (CCTR) by providing a 50 per cent reimbursement
(or the alternative of a 100 per cent reimbursement) of out-of-pocket childcare costs
up to a maximum. We use the Melbourne Institute’s microsimulation model MITTS to
predict whether this subsidy is expected to have a positive impact on workforce
participation of parents with caring responsibilities, and to compute the cost to the
government after taking labour supply responses into account.
In the before and after reform situation, it is assumed that the social security
and income tax system are the same (as was current on 1 July 2006). In addition, it is
assumed that the Child Care Benefit (CCB) remains unchanged. The only difference
is that the current 30 per cent CCTR for formal childcare costs is replaced with a
reimbursement of 50 per cent (or 100 per cent) of the out-of-pocket formal and informal
childcare costs up to a maximum amount of either $20,000 per year per family or the
earned income of the secondary earner, whichever is the lower of the two. Both the
CCTR and the two alternatives proposed by the TOCC are available to couples where
both partners are either in work, studying, or looking for work. If the secondary partner
or the single person does not have a positive income then the maximum amount which
is rebatable is set to $20,000.
The current CCTR is paid out through the tax system with a delay of 1 to 2
years (that is childcare costs made in 2004-2005 can be claimed for the 2005-2006 tax
year after July 2006).2 The rebate paid in the current system is a tax refund. It can only
be paid if the parents have a sufficiently large tax liability in the relevant tax year. In
contrast, the proposed alternative would be paid out directly (fortnightly) through
alternative channels. Unfortunately, the effect of this difference in timing of the payment
cannot be assessed. However, we run an alternative simulation which assumes the
delayed payment has zero value to the families to compare with the main simulation
which assumes the delay in payment makes no difference in the value of the payment
to the families. The two simulations represent the two extreme assumptions of no time
related discounting versus full discounting of the total value of CCTR.
The proposed policy alternative also allows for more choice by households,
with regard to the type of childcare they would like to use, by allowing informal care
costs to be reimbursed as well as formal childcare costs.
2
 In the 2007-2008 Budget some improvements were announced: the CCTR will be available at
the end of each financial year as a direct payment rather than a rebate depending on the amount of
income tax paid.
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3. Simulating a Change in Childcare Subsidies
We use MITTS, a microsimulation model, to calculate the effect of changing the current
childcare subsidies to those proposed by the TOCC. The expected effects presented in
this paper are based on structural labour supply models estimated and described in
more detail in Kalb and Lee (2007). The labour supply effects are not actually observed
but based on simulation outcomes. A detailed general description of the behavioural
microsimulation modelling approach used in this analysis can be found in Creedy and
Kalb (2005, 2006) and specific information on MITTS can be found in Creedy et al.
(2002, 2004).
A brief description of the simulation approach used to analyse the proposed
policy reform is provided in section 3.1. Assumptions underlying the model and
limitations of the model are outlined briefly in section 3.2.
3.1 Details on the Simulation
The microsimulation is based on a sample of representative Australian households in
the 2002/2003 Survey of Income and Housing Costs (SIHC) collected by the Australian
Bureau of Statistics (ABS). Using the weights provided by the ABS, the sample can
be weighted to obtain population amounts. This is the latest survey available that has
been incorporated in the microsimulation model. Detailed information is available on
each household and on the individuals in the households. This allows us to replicate
the social security payments received and income tax paid for each individual and
household. Since 2002/2003 data are being used to analyse the effects of a proposed
policy change in 2006, the information needs to be updated to 2006 values using the
Consumer Price Index and the Average Weekly Earnings Indices for men and women
(ABS: 2006a, 2006b).
The SIHC contains no information on childcare use and cost, so these are
imputed for each household based on a model estimated using the second wave of
Households, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) data, using household
and individual characteristics which are observed in the HILDA and the SIHC data. A
brief description of how childcare costs are imputed is given in Appendix A. Details
on this methodology can be found in Doiron and Kalb (2005a, or in the more extended
version: 2005b), who estimated a model using the 1996-1997 SIHC and the 1996
Australian Bureau of Statistics’ (ABS) Child Care Survey data. These models were
recently updated based on the 2002 wave of the HILDA and the 2002/2003 SIHC in
Kalb and Lee (2007). The updated models were used for the microsimulation analysis
in this paper.
The steps in the approach used are as follows. First, for families with children
up to 12 years of age, the cost of informal childcare and demand for formal childcare
are jointly estimated using a bivariate tobit model, conditional on labour supply and
on household characteristics (see Kalb and Lee 2007 for results of the estimation).
Second, formal childcare demand is translated into formal childcare costs by multiplying
the hours of formal childcare use with average formal childcare fees by state and age
of the child. Average formal childcare fees are constructed for 2002 using information
from the Census of Child Care Services (Department of Family and Community
Services, 2003).3 These fees are inflated by the CPI in the simulations in this paper. In
3
 See Appendix C for a table with the fees by state and age of the child.
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addition, we have increased childcare fees by an additional amount of 42.4 per cent
over the period from 2002 to mid 2006, based on four years with an additional yearly
12.4 per cent increase in childcare prices as reported for the two years from 2004 to
2006 in Taskforce on Care Costs (2006a). This would result in a 59.6 per cent price
increase over the four years. Over the same time period of four years, the increase in
CPI was 12.1 per cent, so the increase in childcare fees in addition to the CPI was 42.4
per cent (1.596/1.121=1.424). Third, the imputed childcare costs are used to impute
revised net incomes (the original net incomes minus the imputed childcare costs) for
the households in the SIHC. Finally, labour supply parameters are estimated taking
into account the imputed childcare costs (see Kalb and Lee 2007 for the estimated
parameters). Appendix B briefly describes the steps involved in estimating the
parameters of the structural discrete choice labour supply model.
The estimated parameters from the structural labour supply model are key
inputs in the behavioural component of the microsimulation model. The labour supply
models, generating the labour supply responses in this paper, are based on a quadratic
utility function with preference parameters which are allowed to vary with an
individual’s characteristics. The models are identified by the observed relationships
between imputed net wage rates (as derived from observed or predicted gross wage
rates) and labour supply in the 2002/2003 SIHC data. Gross wages depend on industry,
occupation, work experience, state and degree of urbanisation of residency, in addition
to some variables such as education and age which are also assumed to affect leisure
and income preference parameters directly. The number and age of children is assumed
to affect labour supply through the preferences for leisure and income but not wages
directly. It is further assumed that there are no unobserved variables correlated with
both gross wage rates and labour supply. If the latter does not hold the two-stage
estimation of this relationship might be biased.
The models’ parameters allow us to simulate the labour supply responses of
the alternative childcare subsidy. The simulation of the effects of the subsidy involves
the use of alternative budget constraints in the pre- and post-reform situation. The
budget constraints incorporate all main tax and transfer programs and are computed
using MITTS. In the pre-reform situation, it is assumed that the 30 per cent CCTR is
available. In the post-reform situation, the CCTR is replaced with the 50 per cent (or
100 per cent) TOCC reimbursement of out-of-pocket childcare costs. The budget
constraints are used to calculate net income before and after the reform at each possible
discrete hours point. Using the models’ parameters, the deterministic component of
the utility at each of the hours points can be computed. To this a random component is
added in the simulation (and in the estimation). The estimation and simulation are
based on the assumption that individuals choose the point with the highest utility, so
the observed hours must be associated with the highest utility.
Two alternative simulations of the effects of the subsidy are provided in section
4. Both examine the implications for net government expenditure. The first assumes
that labour supplies are fixed (section 4.1), while the second (section 4.2) allows
individuals to adjust their labour supply, where appropriate, in response to the change
in the tax and transfer system. For the second type of simulation, average labour supply
responses are reported in addition to the effect on net government expenditure.
The behavioural simulation begins by taking the discrete hours level for each
individual that is closest to the observed hours level. Next, a set of random draws of
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the error term in the labour supply model, which are consistent with the actual observed
hours before the change, is selected. That is, for these draws of the error term, the
model selects the observed hours as the labour supply point corresponding to the
highest utility level. Conditional on this set of random draws, a probability distribution
over the set of discrete hours for each individual under the alternative policy regime
is generated. Thus the same error terms, representing the random utility component
which is for example due to unobserved factors, are used before and after the reform.
However, the tax and transfer system is changed in the reform, which changes net
household incomes, and as a result changes the deterministic utility levels. The labour
supply after the reform is calculated as the average outcome across all draws of the
error terms.
3.2 Assumptions Underlying the Analysis
In order to simulate the current situation and the situation under the alternative proposed
policy, a few assumptions and simplifications are needed in the microsimulation model.
A crucial assumption is that no one who would like to enter the labour market or
increase their hours worked is restricted by a lack of labour demand. In the current
situation of low unemployment, this is a reasonable assumption to make, although
there still may be a mismatch of skills between the additional workers and the available
vacancies. Another assumption in the microsimulation modelling is that everyone who
is eligible for any of the government-provided payments will take up these payments.
The current CCTR received is calculated based on current childcare costs,
current income and current labour force status, because information for preceding years
is not available in the data. In addition, the model is a point-in-time model and cannot
account for the effect of delaying the payment (that is, rebating childcare costs of
2004-2005 at the end of the financial year 2005-2006).  As far as the model is concerned,
households receive the CCTR payment as soon as they make the childcare costs. This
delay is likely to be particularly important for low-income households, where the
additional childcare payments may be crucial in the labour force decision and the two-
year wait for the subsidy might be very difficult to bridge (that is, without the additional
payments, employment may not be viable for the primary carer). This inability to allow
for time delays causes us to overestimate the CCTR effect on labour force participation,
and as a consequence of overestimating the CCTR effect, the TOCC will be
underestimated because we are comparing the alternative policy to something that is
more favourable to labour supply than the current situation is in reality. The present
value of the CCTR is lower than the amount we calculate because it will be paid in the
future rather than immediately. The effect of the TOCC alternatives is likely to be
underestimated due to leaving out this difference in waiting time between the current
policy and the alternative policies. An upper bound of the effect we are interested in is
obtained by carrying out an alternative simulation, ignoring the CCTR completely.
Finally, any changes in childcare pricing by childcare providers or behavioural
changes in households’ demands for childcare (beyond the obvious increase in childcare
use when labour supply increases) resulting from the proposed changes in childcare
subsidies are not included in this modelling. For example, we assume that the additional
subsidy will not lead to increased childcare prices and that parents are not going to
choose more expensive forms of childcare due to the increased subsidy. Neither do we
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allow for an increase in childcare prices as a result of the potential increase in the
demand for childcare due to higher subsidies.
4. Simulation Results
This section first presents the effects of the policy change on government expenditure
and revenue under the assumption that there is no labour supply response to the policy
change. The second subsection allows individuals to adjust their labour supply, where
appropriate, and presents the corresponding effects these labour supply responses have
on net government expenditure.
4.1 Results for Fixed Labour Supply
We briefly present results under the assumption of no labour supply response. In other
words, everyone is assumed to work the same number of hours before and after the
policy change. The results presented in this subsection therefore do not depend on the
estimated parameters of the labour supply model. The simulated total expenditure on
childcare-related subsidies in the current situation and under the alternative policies is
presented in table 1. When labour supply is fixed, government expenditure on current
social security payments and family payments, and government revenue from income
taxation and the Medicare levy will not change.4
Table 1 - Total Annual Government Expenditures on Childcare Subsidies
Before and After the Introduction of the TOCC Reimbursement (in $ millions)
Current System 50% TOCC 100% TOCC
Child Care Benefit Payments 772 772 772
Child Care July 2006 Tax Rebate 458 0 0
Child Care TOCC reimbursement 0 1220 2450
Total 1230 1992 3222
The ABS (2007) reports that in 2003/04 just over 700,000 customers made
use of approved services for which they received CCB. A total amount of 1.4 billion
dollars was spent on CCB, which increased to 1.5 billion dollars in 2005/2006. The
predicted amount of CCB in MITTS is 0.8 billion dollars. It appears that childcare use
and cost are underreported in the HILDA data.5 No official information is yet available
regarding CCTR, since the first payments occurred after the financial year 2005/2006.
The aggregate level of family payments in 2005/2006 was about 15.3 billion dollars,
which is close to the amount predicted by MITTS of 16.5 billion dollars (at the higher
2006/2007 payment rates).
A comparison of the simulated amounts of allowances, pensions and income
tax paid are not available for single parents and couples separately. Earlier comparisons
for the total population showed that the amount of unemployment-related allowances
and parenting-related allowances/pensions predicted by MITTS were close to the
official amounts. MITTS mostly overestimates the amounts to a modest extent, possibly
4
 Labour supply is fixed to the level observed in the 2002/2003 data.
5
 A similar CCB amount is calculated when using the HILDA data and its population weights
directly.
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due to not taking non-take up of payments into account, for example, when the eligibility
is for a small amount only.
The underestimation of the amount of CCB leads to underestimation of the
additional expenditure but also to underestimation of the labour supply effects, since
fewer people are identified to benefit from the policy change. Comparing the current
system (1 July 2006) which includes the 30 per cent CCTR with the current system
where the CCTR is replaced with the 50 per cent TOCC reimbursement, the expected
increase in total government expenditure, assuming that everyone remains at the same
hours level is $0.762 billion. When the Child Care Tax Rebate is replaced with the 100
per cent TOCC reimbursement, the expected increase is $1.992 billion. These amounts
are likely to be somewhat underpredicted if childcare costs, are indeed underestimated
in our model as seems to be the case, given the predicted amount of CCB payments
under the current system compared with the officially reported amount of CCB. The
relative size of the effects is however expected to remain similar. That is, increasing
the 50 per cent reimbursement to a 100 per cent reimbursement will be relatively costly.
The net result in terms of changes in the total subsidies as a percentage of
childcare costs is that a larger proportion of childcare costs is now subsidised. However
for couple families, there is a small issue in the TOCC proposal with the difference in
treatment of individuals on a low income versus those without income. Under the
proposed 50 per cent reimbursement, if the secondary person does not have positive
income, the maximum amount which is rebatable is set to $20,000. However, if the
secondary person has a small amount of income (e.g. $1,000 a year), the 50 per cent
TOCC reimbursement is based on the lesser amount of the actual care costs and the
total labour-related income of the lower income spouse. Under the current rebate system,
eligibility for the CCTR can be fully or partly transferred to the primary earner. As a
result, although in principle the proposed 50 per cent reimbursement is more generous
than the current 30 per cent rebate, some couples with low secondary earnings (and
high childcare costs) may end up with a smaller proportion of their childcare costs
subsidised after the reform.6
Due to the clause that the reimbursements are the lesser amount of actual care
costs or the total income of the lower income spouse combined with the fact that many
secondary earners earn relatively small amounts, and the fact that couple families are
more likely to use childcare even if the primary carer is not in paid employment, the
overall effect is to increase the subsidy as a percentage of childcare costs by a lesser
amount for couple families than for sole parent families.
Table 2 provides an overview of the average weekly gross childcare costs and
the subsidies available under the current system and under the two alternative TOCC
policies. As expected, given that CCB is an income-tested subsidy, the table shows
that the amount of CCB decreases with income and with the amount of labour supply.
Non-employment reduces the amount of CCB for which one is eligible due to a larger
probability of not fulfilling the minimum hours of work or study requirement.
6
 It is a theoretical possibility which would affect a very small group of secondary earners only, if
at all. There is no evidence from this analysis that secondary earners choose to withdraw from the
labour force due to the policy change. In addition, to remain eligible for the reimbursement, the
secondary earners would need to look for work or study. It is unlikely that households on such low
secondary incomes would have sufficiently high childcare costs resulting in higher CCTR than the
50 per cent TOCC reimbursement.
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Table 2 - Average Weekly Childcare Costs and Subsidies for Families with
Dependent Children who have Positive Childcare Costs (in $ per week)
Child Care Tax
Rebates/TOCC Amounts Net Child Care Costs
Gross Child
Child Care
Care Benefit TOCC TOCC TOCC TOCC
Costs Amounts Current 50% 100% Current 50% 100%
Single Parent Families
Gross weekly income subgroups
$0 - $200 73.6 27.9 2.1 6.0 11.9 43.6 39.7 33.8
$200 - $800 102.3 32.1 13.6 34.6 69.1 56.5 35.6 1.0
$800 - $1200 111.1 27.7 16.9 41.5 83.0 66.6 42.0 0.5
> $1200 89.6 7.8 12.0 40.7 81.4 69.8 41.1 0.5
Employment subgroups
Not employed 70.6 26.6 0.7 2.9 5.8 43.3 41.1 38.3
Employed part-time 97.6 33.7 12.7 30.3 60.6 51.1 33.6 3.3
Employed full-time 107.8 25.0 15.4 41.3 82.5 67.5 41.6 0.3
Couple Families
Gross weekly income subgroups
$0 - $200 85.9 28.7 1.1 5.9 11.7 56.0 51.3 45.4
$200 - $800 98.3 27.7 4.1 10.9 21.8 66.6 59.7 48.8
$800 - $1200 105.5 24.4 7.3 20.2 40.4 73.7 60.9 40.7
> $1200 126.6 13.4 16.8 45.4 90.8 96.4 67.8 22.4
Employment subgroups
Not employed 99.3 21.3 1.7 5.7 11.4 76.2 72.3 66.6
Employed part-time 120.2 18.7 16.4 46.9 93.8 85.1 54.6 7.7
Employed full-time 136.6 15.8 22.7 55.0 109.9 98.1 65.9 11.0
Note: Net Child Care Cost = Gross Child Care Cost – Child Care Benefit – (Child Care Tax
Rebate or TOCC). Part-time employment is defined as working 1 to 30 hours, full-time
employment is defined as working more than 30 hours. The employment status in couple families
is defined by female hours of work.
The amount of CCTR increases with income since childcare costs increase
with income and CCB decreases with income, so that the rebatable out-of-pocket costs
increase.7 In addition, the amount of income tax paid, against which the rebate is
assessed, increases. Compared to the current situation, everyone’s situation improves
when the 50 and 100 per cent reimbursement schemes are introduced. However, the
higher income groups benefit more than the lower income groups partly due to the
higher childcare cost and partly due to the higher proportion who are working in these
high-income groups (employment, looking for work or study is a requirement for the
reimbursement). Similarly those working full-time benefit more than those working
part-time, and those working part-time benefit more than those out of employment.
The latter group only receives the reimbursement if they are looking for work, are in
training, or study.
7
 The two highest income categories for single parents contain relatively few individuals, so the
average costs are based on small samples in these categories.
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4.2 Results Allowing for Labour Supply Responses
In this subsection, individuals are no longer assumed to work the same hours before
and after the reform. They are allowed to change their labour supply in response to the
policy change. For each simulation of the effect of changing the current system to the
proposed alternative, two runs are required from the simulation model. This is due to
the fact that the data used in the simulation is not collected in 2006 but in 2002/2003.
Because we use observed labour supply as the starting point in our simulations and the
data are from 2002/2003, the starting point also needs to be 2002/2003. We therefore
need to simulate the effect on labour supply when going from the tax and transfer
system as it was in 2002/2003 to the current tax and transfer system (July 2006) and to
the alternative system as proposed by the TOCC. We can then take the difference
between the alternative TOCC system and the current tax and transfer system by taking
the difference between the two sets of results obtained from the two simulation runs.
Table 3 presents the results on Government Revenue and Expenditure under
the different systems for sole parents and couples with dependent children separately.
The first three rows in each part of the table present the predicted revenue, consisting
of the amount of income tax and the Medicare levy. The table shows that both revenue
components increase for sole parent and couple families.
Table 3 - Government Revenue and Expenditure under the Different Policies
by Demographic Group (in $millions per year)
Current System 50% TOCC 100% TOCC
Sole parents
Government Revenue
Income Tax 2594.2 2644.4 2702.6
Medicare 137.3 139.9 142.2
Total Revenue 2731.5 2784.3 2844.8
Government Expenditure
Tax Rebates 424.8 421.9 423.8
Family Tax Benefit, part A and B 4874.6 4869.8 4865.2
Allowances 4035.2 3949.6 3840.9
Pensions 364.0 363.8 362.9
Pharmaceutical Allowance 60.3 59.9 59.6
Rent Allowance 626.4 625.0 623.5
Total Expenditure 10385.3 10290.0 10175.9
Net Expenditure 7653.8 7505.7 7331.1
Childcare subsidies 281.4 436.2 821.4
Couples with dependent children
Government Revenue
Income Tax 36875.6 36992.3 37146.6
Medicare 3001.1 3015.3 3035.0
Total Revenue 39876.7 40007.6 40181.7
Government Expenditure
Tax Rebates 743.2 745.4 749.7
Family Tax Benefit, part A and B 11615.1 11533.9 11423.7
Allowances 3630.7 3599.5 3564.6
Pensions 1233.7 1233.7 1233.3
Pharmaceutical Allowance 10.1 10.0 10.0
Rent Allowance 634.5 632.1 628.4
Total Expenditure 17867.3 17754.6 17609.7
Net Expenditure -22009.4 -22253.0 -22572.0
Childcare subsidies 708.8 1272.8 2361.3
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The following seven rows in both parts of table 3 present information on
government expenditure components. All expenditures, except the rebates, decrease
with the introduction of the TOCC reimbursement policies. In theory, an increase in
income can have two alternative (and opposite) effects on the amount of tax rebate
received.  First, the increase in paid income taxes could mean there is a larger amount
of tax to be offset by the tax rebates. This would cause tax rebates to increase. Second,
the increase in income could mean that individuals now fall into the withdrawal range
of the rebate, which would cause a decrease in tax rebates. The first effect dominates
in most cases. That is, tax rebates mostly increase slightly due to the increase in income
tax paid by the households. The exception is for the 50 per cent TOCC in the sole
parents group. In this group, the second effect dominates.
Amongst the expenditures, allowances (such as NewStart Allowance or
Parenting Allowance) and family payments decrease to the largest extent. Only few
households with children would receive any pension payments, and people on pensions
(such as Disability Support Pension or the Age Pension) are usually not expected to
respond to financial incentives. The following row represents the net government
expenditure taking the difference between total expenditure and total revenue. The
fact that it is negative for couple families with children indicates that the government
receives more income tax and Medicare levy payments from these households than it
spends on income support and family payments for these households. That is, net
revenue is positive for this group. Finally, the predicted amounts of childcare subsidies
are presented separately in the bottom row and are an additional separate expenditure
to the government.8
Compared with the increase in childcare subsidies due to implementing the
50 per cent and 100 per cent TOCC reimbursement (of 0.719 billion and 2.193 billion
dollars per year respectively), the expected increase in net government revenue (or the
decrease in net government expenditure) is about 54 and 40 per cent of the expected
additional cost in subsidies respectively.9 For sole parents, the cost of the 50 per cent
TOCC reimbursement seems to be close to completely returned in increased tax revenue
and decreased income support. An increase in labour supply of sole parents is more
likely to result in both increased tax revenue and decreased income support than an
increase in labour supply of partnered mothers. The partners’ incomes of the latter
group may be sufficient to make most partnered mothers ineligible for income support
even when they are not in paid employment.
The labour supply responses for single parents are reported in table 4 while
the labour supply responses for couples are reported in table 5. Comparing labour
supply effects across the demographic groups, a larger effect is observed for sole parents
than for partnered mothers. The larger effect could be partly due to a larger proportion
8
 The total childcare subsidies presented in table 3 are somewhat different from those presented in
table 1. This is mostly due to the predicted changes in labour supply. In addition, there is a small
difference due to the calculation of all payments at the discrete labour supply points, which means
all observed hours are rounded to the closest multiple of 5 hours (for all individuals except partnered
men) or 10 hours (for partnered men).
9
 These two percentages are derived by adding childcare subsidies for sole parents and couples
with children and by adding the net expenditures for sole parents and couples with children. We
then take the difference between the alternative policy and the current policy and compute the
proportion of the change in the childcare subsidies which is compensated by the increased revenue
for the government.
49
GUYONNE KALB AND WANG-SHENG LEE
The Effect of an Alternative Childcare Subsidy on Labour Supply: A Policy Simulation
of sole parents using informal care (and paying for this informal care, even if it is a
small amount), especially when they are on a low income, and partly it could be due to
the lower wages (and lower household incomes) of sole parents on average, which
means the childcare subsidy is more relevant to this group’s labour supply. As a result,
they are likely to benefit to a larger extent from the proposed changes.
Table 4 - Summary of Labour Supply Responses for Single Parent Families with
Dependent Children (in per cent of the population)
Current System 50% TOCC 100% TOCC
Labour force participants 52.18 53.99 57.03
Self employed 4.91 4.91 4.91
Wage and salary workers 47.27 49.08 52.12
Average hours change (in hours per week) 0.57 1.46
Table 5 - Summary of Labour Supply Responses for Couple Families with
Dependent Children (in per cent of the population)
Current System 50% TOCC 100% TOCC
Men Women Men Women Men Women
Labour force participants 89.17 61.12 89.27 61.74 89.40 62.63
Self employed 14.64 8.14 14.64 8.14 14.64 8.14
Wage and salary workers 74.53 52.98 74.63 53.6 74.76 54.49
Average hours change
(in hours per week) 0.04 0.20 0.08 0.51
A very small effect is observed for partnered men. This result is as expected
and is consistent with results found by other researchers.10 Married men usually work
full time and are not affected much by changes in financial incentives. The effect
observed for partnered women is somewhat larger than for partnered men but lower
than for sole parents. We suspect that the relatively small effect is due to the
reimbursement being paid to a relatively large number of individuals who already are
in the labour market.
The distribution over the available labour supply points, disaggregated by
income and employment status, is presented in table 6 for sole parents and in table 7
for partnered mothers. Single parents on low income are predominantly out of the
labour force. Introducing the 50 and 100 per cent reimbursement schemes reduces the
proportion who are not in paid work slightly. The proportion of nonparticipants is
smaller after the TOCC policy change for all groups. Under the 50 per cent
reimbursement scheme, the reduction in the proportion of nonparticipants is highest
for the $200-$800 income group; under the 100 per cent reimbursement scheme, the
lowest income group experiences the largest reduction in the proportion of
nonparticipants.
10
 Most other researchers ignore the effects of financial incentives on married men, most likely due
to the small effects expected or observed for men. Blundell et al. (2000) are an exception and they
also find a small effect.
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Table 6 - Distribution of Sole Parents over the Levels of Labour Supply (in per
cent of population, 0 includes those who are self employed)
Hours per week 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 Total
Gross weekly income subgroups
Current System 52.7 2.1 3.5 3.0 4.5 3.0 4.2 5.6 11.8 3.1 6.5 100.0
$0 - 200 90.8 3.1 3.2 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.2 100.0
$200 - 800 13.1 1.3 6.3 8.8 13.6 9.3 10.8 9.6 16.3 3.7 7.2 100.0
$800 - 1200 7.3 0.3 0.1 0.0 2.2 0.2 6.8 13.2 37.9 7.9 24.0 100.0
> $1200 9.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 1.7 16.9 37.9 12.0 21.9 100.0
50% TOCC 50.9 2.0 3.6 3.1 4.7 3.2 4.5 5.8 12.2 3.2 6.6 100.0
$0 - 200 89.4 3.1 3.4 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.3 100.0
$200 - 800 9.7 1.2 6.2 8.9 14.1 9.7 11.6 9.9 17.3 4.0 7.5 100.0
$800 - 1200 6.9 0.3 0.0 0.0 2.1 0.2 6.7 13.3 38.1 8.0 24.3 100.0>
$1200 9.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 1.7 16.9 37.9 12.1 21.9 100.0
100% TOCC 47.9 2.0 3.7 3.5 5.2 3.8 5.0 6.2 12.5 3.5 6.8 100.0
$0 - 200 83.9 3.1 3.8 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.2 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.5 100.0
$200 - 800 9.1 1.2 5.8 8.7 13.8 9.9 11.8 10.1 17.6 4.2 7.8 100.0
$800 - 1200 6.9 0.3 0.0 0.0 2.1 0.2 6.7 13.3 38.1 8.1 24.4 100.0
> $1200 9.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 1.7 16.9 38.0 12.1 21.8 100.0
Table 7 - Distribution of Partnered Mothers over the Levels of Labour Supply (in
per cent of population, 0 includes those who are self employed)
Hours per week 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 Total
Gross weekly income subgroups
Current System 47.0 2.8 4.0 4.9 7.0 5.7 5.8 4.9 10.7 2.6 4.6 100.0
$0 - 200 93.0 2.8 2.9 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 100.0
$200 - 800 74.0 2.6 2.9 3.1 3.8 2.3 3.9 1.2 4.4 0.6 1.2 100.0
$800 - 1200 56.7 3.9 6.0 4.8 7.5 3.2 4.7 3.3 6.6 0.9 2.5 100.0
> $1200 28.5 2.5 3.8 6.3 8.9 8.3 7.6 7.3 15.5 4.2 7.1 100.0
50% TOCC 46.4 2.8 4.0 5.0 7.1 5.7 5.9 5.0 10.8 2.7 4.7 100.0
$0 - 200 92.7 2.8 2.9 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 100.0
$200 - 800 73.7 2.6 2.9 3.2 3.9 2.3 4.0 1.2 4.4 0.6 1.2 100.0
$800 - 1200 56.2 3.9 6.0 4.9 7.7 3.2 4.8 3.3 6.6 0.9 2.5 100.0
> $1200 27.7 2.5 3.8 6.3 8.9 8.4 7.7 7.4 15.8 4.3 7.2 100.0
100% TOCC 45.5 2.8 4.0 5.0 7.2 5.9 6.0 5.1 11.0 2.8 4.7 100.0
$0 - 200 92.1 2.7 2.9 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 100.0
$200 - 800 72.8 2.6 3.0 3.3 4.0 2.5 4.1 1.4 4.5 0.7 1.3 100.0
$800 - 1200 55.2 3.9 6.1 5.0 7.9 3.4 5.0 3.5 6.7 1.0 2.5 100.0
> $1200 26.9 2.4 3.8 6.3 9.0 8.6 7.8 7.5 16.1 4.4 7.3 100.0
The expected reduction in the proportion of nonparticipants, due to the policy
change, is much lower for partnered mothers, as shown in table 7. Given the father’s
income, the relationship between gross unit-level income and the mother’s labour
force participation is much weaker than it is for sole parents. The expected effect of
the TOCC policy changes on the proportion who are not in paid employment is generally
larger for partnered women in families with higher gross weekly incomes.
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Table 8 disaggregates the overall changes in labour supply, labour force
participation and reduced net government expenditure by income level and initial
employment status.11 For single parents, labour supply effects are largest for those
who have a gross income of between $200 and $800 per week, which is likely to
correspond to part-time work. Disaggregation by employment status shows that part-
time workers are expected to be the group most affected by the policy changes. Similar
to the result in table 6, the 100 per cent reimbursement scheme is expected to affect
those in the lowest income group the most. Although those who are not employed are
affected much more by the 100 per cent scheme than by the 50 per cent scheme, the
group most affected by the 100 per cent reimbursement are part-time workers.
Table 8 - Average Weekly Changes in Labour Supply, Labour Force Participation
and Government expenditure for Families with Dependent Children
Labour Force Government
Labour Supply Participation Expenditure
(in hours per week) (in %-points) (in $ per week)
TOCC TOCC TOCC TOCC TOCC TOCC
50% 100% 50% 100% 50% 100%
Single Parent Families
Gross weekly income subgroups
$0 - $200 0.37 1.81 1.43 6.92 -2.59 -10.74
$200 - $800 1.19 1.63 3.41 3.98 -11.18 -16.59
$800 - $1200 0.23 0.26 0.41 0.41 -2.90 -3.22
> $1200 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.12 -0.36 -0.39
Employment subgroups
Not employed 0.30 1.79 1.27 7.20 -1.55 -9.24
Employed part-time 1.18 2.01 3.76 4.83 -12.80 -23.11
Employed full-time 0.66 0.71 1.53 1.64 -5.74 -6.19
Couple Families
Gross weekly income subgroups
$0 - $200 0.07 0.27 0.28 0.90 -1.91 -6.30
$200 - $800 0.09 0.33 0.37 1.28 -0.83 -3.24
$800 - $1200 0.11 0.39 0.49 1.53 -0.71 -2.49
> $1200 0.29 0.64 0.79 1.65 -3.23 -6.49
Employment subgroups
Not employed 0.16 0.64 0.69 2.48 -1.18 -4.50
Employed part-time 0.17 0.37 0.54 0.79 -2.59 -5.95
Employed full-time 0.36 0.62 0.79 1.31 -4.11 -6.92
Note: Part-time employment is defined as working 1 to 30 hours, full-time employment is
defined as working more than 30 hours. The employment status in couple families is defined by
female hours of work.
11
 This is the employment status as observed in the 2002/2003 SIHC data. Therefore, labour force
participation can increase due to the TOCC policy change even for those who were employed in
2002/2003, since they may have a positive probability of being out of the labour force in the 2006
starting point.
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Labour force participation changes follow a similar pattern as labour supply
changes, with the exception that under the 100 per cent scheme, labour force
participation increases to the largest extent for the nonemployed group. In terms of
the effect on government expenditure per family, the reduction in expenditure or net
taxes (defined as expenditure on social security payments minus any income tax paid)
is generally largest for the groups with the largest labour supply response in the first
two columns.
The effects on partnered mothers’ labour supply and on net taxes received
from couples are much smaller per family than they were for sole parents. Larger
effects are found for those on higher unit-level incomes, but the lowest income group
has a relatively high reduction in net taxes despite the small labour responses. This is
due to their higher dependence on income support, which means their labour responses
translate into less expenditure on social security in addition to more revenue from
income tax. The highest income group is also observed to experience a high reduction
in net taxes. This is possibly due to an increase in two-earner families (as reflected by
the increase in labour force participation), which is expected to reduce the amount of
Family Tax Benefit part B paid by the government. Only one-earner families or two-
earner families with a secondary earner on low income qualify for this payment. Full-
time workers also have relatively high labour responses, which translate into relatively
high government savings, although this amount is still well below the amount of savings
achieved for some of the sole parents subgroups.
Finally, as mentioned in section 3.2, we assess the effect of the rebate being
paid at the time that the cost is made rather than after 1 to 2 years, as is the case with
the current CCTR. In an alternative simulation, we exclude the CCTR when predicting
current labour supply in July 2006. This would lead to a lower predicted labour supply
in the starting point. On average for sole parents, labour supply would be 0.4 hours
lower and labour force participation would be 1.4 percentage points lower. For married
women, labour supply would be 0.15 hours lower and labour force participation would
be 0.45 percentage points lower and for married men the difference would be quite
small but in the same direction as for the other two groups. Compared with these
lower labour supply levels, the labour supply under the alternative policies proposed
by the TOCC would look more favourable, particularly for sole parents. The ‘true’
expected labour supply effect of introducing the TOCC reimbursements is likely to lie
in between the values presented in the tables of this section and the larger effect implied
by the lower expected labour supply in the starting point if the child care tax rebate
were not taken into account.
5. Conclusion
This paper has analysed how, relative to the existing policy in Australia in July 2006,
a proposal by the Taskforce on Care Costs (TOCC) to increase childcare subsidies
through the provision of increased reimbursements to families for the cost of caring is
expected to affect the labour force participation of sole parents and couple families,
and the government’s net expenditure. An estimated childcare demand and labour
supply model (Kalb and Lee, 2007) has been used to predict the labour supply responses
arising from a policy change proposed by the TOCC in 2006. Such analysis can be
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useful in providing additional information to assist policy formulation and planning.
This paper has shown that replacing the 30 per cent CCTR with a 50 per cent
reimbursement of childcare costs (making it independent of income tax payments) up
to a maximum of $20,000 of childcare costs per family per year is expected to have
substantial labour supply responses. The reforms are predicted to return just over 50
per cent of the original additional outlay for the increased subsidies through increased
income tax and reduced income support payments arising from increased labour supply.
The predicted increase in revenue as a percentage of the original additional cost is
particularly high for sole parents (nearly 100 per cent). Further increasing the
reimbursement from 50 per cent to 100 per cent reduces the percentage of the original
cost returned to the government to 40 per cent.
Although this paper has not addressed the complex issue of administering the
alternative subsidy, it appears that carefully constructed childcare subsidy reforms
could potentially have a substantial effect on labour force participation at a relatively
modest cost to the government.
Appendix A - The Imputation of Childcare Costs
The estimated parameters of a demand for formal childcare and cost of informal
childcare model are used to impute childcare costs for households in the SIHC sample
at different levels of hours of work. The modelling of the budget constraint for each
household (in this case allowing for childcare costs) and the labour supply form part
of the Melbourne Institute Tax and Transfer Simulator (MITTS), a microsimulation
model for Australia.
First, for each hours level, a gross income level (together with all transfers
and taxes) is computed within the MITTS model. Then, for each household with children
of 12 years or younger in the SIHC a predicted cost of childcare is imputed based on
the characteristics of the household (State, urban, number and age of children, couples
versus lone parents, hours of labour supply, qualifications of childcare workers,
childcare fees, and calculated gross income). This childcare cost is generated for each
possible hours level allowed in the labour supply model.
Net costs are calculated from the predicted gross costs of childcare and the
predicted levels of childcare benefits. These are calculated within MITTS based on
the characteristics of the households and the predicted formal childcare costs (which
are computed from predicted formal childcare demand multiplied by the average
childcare fees for that particular household). Any childcare subsidies are deducted
from formal costs (and informal costs in the ‘working model’), before adding the
formal and informal costs together. The result is a predicted net childcare cost for each
household based on predicted formal demands, average fees per household, total
predicted informal care costs and calculated subsidies.
Appendix B - The Labour Supply Model
The labour supply model is described in more technical detail in Kalb (2002) and
Appendix II in Doiron and Kalb (2005a). Here, we provide a brief non-technical
overview. The parameter estimation and microsimulation of discrete hours labour supply
in this paper follows the general method outlined in Van Soest (1995), which is
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explained in more expository detail in Creedy and Kalb (2005). Essentially, three steps
are involved:
Step 1: Specify a model explaining labour supply behaviour based on
utility maximisation.
Households are assumed to maximise a utility function of household consumption
(assumed to equal net household income) and leisure hours of the adults, subject to a
time constraint for each adult and a household budget constraint. This budget constraint
includes all main tax and transfer programs in place at the time of the survey. Households
maximise utility by choosing leisure (and hence labour supply) for each adult.
The assumption behind discrete hours labour supply modelling is that utility
maximising individuals choose from a relatively small number of hours levels rather
than being able to vary hours worked continuously, an assumption which reflects the
fact that individuals typically have a finite number of working options available.
Individuals in the model have the choice between 11 labour supply points if they are
single and 66 points if they are a couple family. In this paper, married women and
singles are assumed to choose between 0, 5, 10, 15, …, 50 hours whereas married men
are assumed to choose from 0, 10, 20, …, 50 hours, given that few married men work
low part-time hours. Married men and married women are assumed to choose jointly
from any combination of the 611 points. More labour supply means less leisure time.
Each of the available labour supply points is associated with a net household income
level and with an amount of leisure (which includes home production time) for each
adult individual in the household.
Step 2: Incorporate all possible details of the tax and transfer system.
In order to compute labour supply parameter estimates, several inputs for each
individual need to be gathered. First, for all possible different values that labour supply
can take, estimates of the childcare costs for each individual need to be imputed. These
predictions are obtained by using a model for predicted demand for formal childcare
and cost of informal care. Next, reflecting these childcare costs and other taxes and
transfer payments, information about the net incomes at all possible hours levels for
each individual are generated in MITTS. With a complex tax and transfer system, the
required net incomes are obtained by applying the rules of the system, along with the
assumption that households take up benefits at each hours level if they are eligible. As
the wage rates of those currently not working cannot be observed, it is necessary to
impute wage rates for non-workers using estimated wage functions. A two-stage
selection model is used to correct for possible selection bias. Separate wage equations
are estimated for married men, married women, single men, single women and lone
parents (see Kalb and Scutella, 2002).
Step 3: Estimate the parameters of the labour supply model.
The discrete labour supply values for each individual are the endogenous variables in
the model. They include the option of not working. Wage rates, non-labour income
(other than taxes and transfers), household composition and other household attributes
are exogenous. Separate models are specified for sole parents and couple families.
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Parameters on net income and leisure/home production time in the household utility
function indicate how much the household values each adults’ leisure and home
production time and how much it values income. These parameters may depend on
individual and household characteristics such as for example, age of the individual,
education and age of the youngest child. To give an example, the presence of a young
child usually decreases the preference for labour supply of women.
Following Keane and Moffitt (1998), a quadratic utility specification is used
for the utility function in this paper, where the preference parameters are allowed to
vary with individuals’ characteristics. An advantage of this utility function is that it is
simple but quite flexible in that it allows for the leisure of each person and income to
be substitutes or complements.
Having specified a utility function and a budget constraint, a maximum
likelihood approach is used to find parameter values which would produce the highest
probability of observing the actual hours values. A likelihood function is specified,
based on actual hours of labour supply and net income, the set of hypothetical net
incomes at alternative unobserved hours, actual individual characteristics, and the
parameters to be optimised. Given a system of non-linear equations derived from the
first-order conditions of this maximisation problem, numerical methods involving a
sequence of iterations from an arbitrary starting point to the solution are employed.
Since we are interested in analysing the effect of varying childcare costs on
hours worked, the household budget constraint also incorporates childcare costs. Rather
than associating each household with one specific predicted childcare cost amount,
recognising the uncertainty in predicted childcare costs, we use a simulation technique.
This involves repeated draws from the distribution of childcare costs to improve the
efficiency of the model. This method provides a more efficient prediction of the
childcare costs since it incorporates the variation in unobservables affecting costs,
based on the estimated variance of these unobservables. A further advantage is the
more accurate calculation of the CCB in this approach, given that the subsidy payable
for the average childcare cost is not the same as the average CCB. The labour supply
model used in the simulation for this paper is based on 10 values drawn from the
distribution of the unobservables in the model of hours of formal care and costs of
informal care.  The labour supply models incorporating childcare costs are therefore
estimated using a simulated maximum likelihood approach. In other words, 10 draws
are taken for each household and the likelihood function is averaged over these draws
before being maximised. The optimal hours level of work can be predicted for each
draw and an average is taken over the draws. Technically, this involves averaging the
hours of work estimates rather than the childcare costs estimates.
Note that the estimated parameters of the labour supply model are actually
those of the utility function. These parameters indirectly determine labour supply in
terms of a distribution of hours worked. By assuming an ‘extreme value’ distribution
for the error term in the utility function, it is possible to derive the relationship between
the probability distribution of hours of work and measured utility levels at each hours
level in a convenient form. After estimation, a point estimate of the expected hours of
work (that is, labour supply) can be computed by multiplying the probability of working
at each discrete value of labour supply by the corresponding discrete value of labour
supply, and taking the sum of these product terms.
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Appendix C - Childcare Fees
An additional external source of data was used to obtain average hourly childcare fees
by age of the child and State of residency. Average fees were calculated from the Child
Care Census 2002 (Department of Family and Community Services, 2003), weighting
the hourly fees of different types of childcare by the number of children of a particular
age using that type of childcare. The hourly fees are calculated by dividing the weekly
fees of Private Long Day Care and Community Long Day Care by 50 hours, Family
Day Care by 35 hours, and Outside School Hours Care services by the average time of
a session. Table C.1 presents the average fees for four age groups by State. The 12.4
per cent additional yearly increases in childcare fees are used to construct hourly fees
for later years.
Table C.1 - Hourly Fees by State/territory and Age of Child in 2002 (in $)
Age of  child
States/Territories 5+ 3-4 2 0-1
New South Wales 3.57 4.00 4.22 4.56
Victoria 3.35 3.84 3.85 3.89
Queensland 3.12 3.56 3.63 3.70
South Australia 3.43 3.96 3.91 3.97
Western Australia 3.78 3.71 3.77 3.88
Tasmania 4.12 4.28 4.25 4.28
Northern Territory 4.59 3.67 3.68 3.76
Australian Capital Territory 4.22 4.30 4.38 4.39
Total 3.43 3.86 3.94 4.07
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